In this paper we study the effect of network structure between agents and objects on measures for systemic risk. We model the influence of sharing large exogeneous losses to the financial or (re)insuance market by a bipartite graph. Using Pareto-tailed losses and multivariate regular variation we obtain asymptotic results for systemic conditional risk measures based on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation. These results allow us to assess the influence of an individual institution on the systemic or market risk and vice versa through a collection of conditional systemic risk measures. For large markets Poisson approximations of the relevant constants are provided in the example of an insurance market. The example of an underlying homogeneous random graph is analysed in detail, and the results are illustrated through simulations. MSC2010 Subject Classifications: primary: 90B15 secondary: 91B30, 60G70, 62P05, 62E20
Introduction
Quantitative assessments of financial risk and of (re)insurance risk has to take the interwoven web of agents and business relationships into account in order to capture systemic risk phenomena. Measuring such risks while accounting for this complex system of agents is an ongoing area of research, see for example [2, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16] . This paper joins the discussion by adapting conditional systemic risk measures which are based on similar asymptotic arguments as classical risk measures. Making use of results derived in [15] , we illustrate these risk measures on a bipartite graph model for the agent-object market structure, combined with a heavy-tailed loss distribution.
The conditional systemic risk measures in this paper are conditional versions of the Valueat-Risk (VaR) defined for a random variable X at confidence level 1 − γ as VaR 1−γ (X) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (X > t) ≤ γ}, γ ∈ (0, 1), and the Conditional Tail Expectation (CoTE), also known as Expected Shortfall, at confidence level 1 − γ, based on the corresponding VaR, as CoTE 1−γ (X) := E[X | X > VaR 1−γ (X)], γ ∈ (0, 1).
(1.1)
For a systemic risk approach it is of interest to quantify not only the risk of single agents, but also the market risk, which is of high relevance to regulators. Moreover, it is natural to investigate an agent's risk based on the aggregated market risk; see e.g. Theorem 2.4 of [20] . Consequently, we will study conditional systemic risk measures where the conditioning event involves the whole market risk as well as its influence on one specific agent. In the same way, it is of interest to evaluate the market risk conditioned on the event that one agent faces high losses. Such ideas lead to a classification of conditional systemic risk measures as in Table 1 .1 (motivated by [9] ) which will be defined in Definition 1.1. Note that the definition of CoVaR is already present in [1] and the ICoTE goes back to the so-called Marginal expected Shortfall from [7] . marginal risk measure institution | institution institution | system system | institution
VaR
MCoVaR ICoVaR SCoVaR CoTE MCoTE ICoTE SCoTE Table 1 .1: Classifying conditional systemic risk measures: "M" stands for mutual indicating the risk measure of one institution given high risk in another institution; "I" stands for individual indicating the risk of an individual institution given high market risk; and "S" stands for system indicating the risk of the system given high risk of an institution.
In [8] , [10] and [16] an axiomatic framework for systemic risk has been suggested. This general framework assumes that a conditional systemic risk measure ρ of a multivariate risk X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) can be represented as the composition of a univariate (single-agent) risk measure ρ 0 with an aggregation function Λ : R n → R n , so that ρ = ρ 0 • Λ. Here, ρ 0 is usually assumed to be convex as well as monotone and positively 1-homogeneous. While the conditions on Λ vary, there is consensus that Λ should be positively 1-homogeneous, so that Λ(ax) = aΛ(x) for a > 0. We deviate from [8] in that we do not assume that Λ((1, . . . , 1) ) = n. Examples for such aggregation functions are Λ(x) = x = ( n i=1 |x i | r ) 1 r , which is a norm for r ≥ 1 and a quasi-norm for 0 < r < 1, and Λ(x) = x i , the projection onto one coordinate. The fact that we do not require Λ((1, . . . , 1) ) = n has consequences in terms of system size: Assuming that ρ 0 is monotone, the inequalities n < (1, . . . , 1) r for 0 < r < 1 as well as n > (1, . . . , 1) r for 1 < r ≤ ∞ hold. Therefore, systemic risk may increase faster or increase slower, respectively, as the number number of individual risks grows compared to systemic risk with respect to a normalized aggregation function. Such effects can be realistic as a larger market may not be proportionally risky to a smaller market due to a balance of risk as is well-known for insurance portfolios. In addition, we argue that in a small and risky market the regulator may well strive for more risk capital than the sum of risks. Also moral hazard from the different institutions is well-known and the regulator may guard against this hazard by choosing a conditional systemic risk measure which is larger than the sum of the individual risks in the market as a quasi-norm would imply. Whatever type of aggregation function is chosen, in practice this is an economical decision. Our framework provides considerable variability in the choice of aggregation function.
In this paper we relate market risk to individual risk in the mathematical framework of multivariate regular variation. This framework allows us to assess conditional systemic risk measures as in Table 1 .1 asymptotically in a precise way. Definition 1.1. [Conditional systemic risk measures] Let F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) be the random exposure vector and let · be a norm or a quasinorm. For γ i , γ ∈ (0, 1) referring to agent i and the market, respectively, the conditional systemic risk measures from Table 1 .1 are defined as follows: To model the complex interaction between economic agents and objects we use a bipartite network, see Figure 1 for a depiction. The network can be summarised through a random q × d weighted adjacency matrix A given by
where W ij are positive weights which may depend on the underlying network. The objects can generate large losses as portfolios in a hedge fund, for instance, or as catastrophic claims in (re)insurance. In Section 5 we shall see that the network is of considerable importance for the asymptotic behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures. Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the bipartite graph model in detail and present the motivating examples. Section 3 summarizes the necessary results from
Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of the market as a bipartite graph.
regular variation. Here we also present the asymptotic results of conditional probabilities and conditional expectations. While we formulate our results in the general context of regular variation with arbitrary dependence structure, we single out the two cases, asymptotic independence and asymptotic complete dependence, of the loss variables. In Section 4 we discuss the asymptotic behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures in our network model. When introducing conditional systemic risk measures, for the individual risk of every agent in the market we focus on the one-dimensional projections of the exposure vector, and take norms and quasi-norms as appropriate aggregation functions. Finally, in Section 5 we also discuss the consequence of the fact that not all claims may be insured or not all assets may find investors, respectively. We furthermore present the homogeneous model, which exactly has this feature. Calculating the network-dependent quantities which determine the asymptotic behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures is not always straightforward; hence we provide a Poisson approximation for some standard specifications of the model, with bounds on the total variation distance. Simulations for the homogeneous model illustrate the results.
The bipartite graph model
Throughout we assume that the objects, which are large claims or losses, have a random amount modelled by random variables V j for j = 1, . . . , d with Pareto-tails such that, for possibly different K j > 0 and tail index α > 0,
(For two functions f and g we write f (t) ∼ g(t) as t → ∞ if lim t→∞ f (t)/g(t) = 1.) We summarize all objects in the vector V = (V 1 , . . . , V d ) and assume that V is independent of the random graph construction, while V 1 , . . . , V d may not be independent of each other. Each agent may cover a random amount or proportion of an object, modelled by a random weight matrix W : Ω → R q×d + , which satisfies the integrability condition E[ W α+δ ] < ∞ for some matrix norm · and some δ > 0. We assume that W ij > 0 for all (i, j) such that i ∼ j. The random variable 1(i ∼ j) equals 1 whenever agent i holds a contractual relationships to object j, and 0 otherwise. The proportion of object j which affects agent i is represented by W ij 1(i ∼ j). Then F i := d j=1 W ij 1(i ∼ j) denotes the exposure of agent i and F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) is the vector of the joint exposures of the agents in the market. Hence, the weighted adjacency matrix A : Ω → R q×d representing the market structure is given by
Consequently, the vector F of agent exposures is the matrix-vector product
Example 2.1.
[Large reinsurance risks, [15] ] In this example, agents are reinsurance companies and objects are large claims. Under the simplified assumption that claims are split into equal proportions among all agents which insure this risk, the market matrix A is
where deg(j) denotes the number of agents that insure object j.
[Coupled portfolios of highly risky assets, [12] ] In this example, agents are investors and objects are investment opportunities. Each agent i has a certain amount of capital to invest, say C i > 0. Again for simplicity, we assume that he splits his money in equal portions to all the assets he has chosen to invest in. This results in a market matrix A given by
where deg(i) denotes the number of different assets agent i invests in.
We consider risk measures of F = AV , where the random matrix A models the network structure of the market. Instead of attributing a risk measure to an agent's exposure or to the market exposure, we write for short an agent's risk or the market risk.
In [15] it was shown that under the assumption of regularly varying exposure vectors the asymptotic behaviour of the VaR and the CoTE can be described using the constants
as well as
where 1 is the d−dimensional vector with entries all equal 1 and
Here the subscripts ind and dep refer to asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent components of the V j 's, respectively. Lemma 2.3 (Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7 of [15] ). Let α > 0 and F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) the vector of the agents' exposures.
(a) The individual Value-at-Risk of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , q} shows the asymptotic behaviour
. . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent. The market Value-at-Risk of the aggregated vector F satisfies
with either C = C S ind or C = C S dep in case V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent.
(b) Let α > 1. The individual Conditional Tail Expectation of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} shows the asymptotic behaviour
. . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent. The market Conditional Tail Expectation of the aggregated vector F satisfies
. . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent.
For the asymptotic behaviour of the Value-at-Risk and of the Conditional Tail Expectation the underlying network model enters only through the constants (2.6) and (2.7). Many underlying networks, even networks for which the adjacency matrix is deterministic, may hence give rise to the same asymptotic behaviour.
When the Pareto-tailed losses are independent, the constant (2.6) with superscript i indicates the individual setting of agent i, whereas S refers to the systemic setting. We contrast this with the fully dependent case; the corresponding quantities are given in (2.7). In general, small constants are more desirable, indicating a smaller risk. The case of fully dependent objects is equivalent to having a single source of risk, but with the loss to be unevenly distributed among the agents.
As indicated in [15] these two extreme dependence cases give rise to risk bounds (cf. [14] ), which are determined using the constants given in (2.6) and (2.7).
Asymptotic results from multivariate regular variation
To obtain asymptotic results as in Lemma 2.3 for the conditional systemic risk measures from Definition 1.1 in a more general framework, we first extend classical results for regular variation to continuous 1-homogeneous functions. Examples for such continuous 1-homogeneous functions are projections of the vector F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) on the i-th coordinate F i , and the norm or quasi-norm of the vector F , which link up with Section 2.
Our framework will be regular variation of the random vector of exposures F , which follows from the Pareto-tailed claims and the dependence structure introduced by the bipartite graph; cf. [15] . There are several equivalent definitions of multivariate regular variation; cf. Theorem 6.1 of [18] and Ch. 2.1 of [4] . Also notions like one point uncompactification and vague convergence are defined there, referring to [18] , Section 6.1.3, for more background.
For 
where v → denotes vague convergence. In this case there exists some α > 0 such that the limit measure is homogeneous of order −α:
for every S ∈ B(E) satisfying µ(∂S) = 0. The measure µ is called intensity measure of X.
The tail index α > 0 is also called the index of regular variation of X, and we write X ∈ R(−α).
Regular variation of V implies regular variation of F under a Breiman condition on the weight matrix W from (2.2). We shall use the following result, which is based on Proposition A.1 in [5] .
Proposition 3.2. Let V := (V 1 , . . . , V d ) be multivariate regularly varying having components with Pareto-tails P(V j > t) ∼ K j t −α as t → ∞ for K j , α > 0 as in (2.1) with intensity measure µ as in (3.1). Furthermore, let the weight matrix W :
for k ∈ N be a continuous 1-homogeneous function. Then we have on
Proof. Vague convergence of F is given by Proposition A.1 in [5] and is equivalent to
for all relatively compact sets B ∈ B(R q + \ {0}) with Eµ • A −1 (∂B) = 0. Furthermore, by 1-homogeneity of h, for t > 0, {h(F ) ∈ tB} = {F ∈ th −1 (B)}. Note also that every B, which is bounded away from zero, is relatively compact in the topology we use. Since h −1 (B) is bounded away from zero by continuity of h and the fact that h(0) = 0, h −1 (B) is also relatively compact.
Putting all this together, for every relatively compact set B ∈ B(h(R q + \ {0})) with Eµ • A −1 • h −1 (∂B) = 0 we have, as t → ∞,
This is equivalent to vague convergence in (3.2).
For the extreme dependence case corresponding to vectors V with asymptotically independent components the reference measure µ has support on the axes; in the extreme dependence case corresponding to vectors V with asymptotically fully dependent components the reference measure µ has support on the line {sK 1/α 1 : s > 0}. This difference in support is reflected in the difference between (2.6) and (2.7) and affects the behaviour of aggregated exposures.
Proposition 3.3. Assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. For the aggregated exposures h(F ) we obtain
if V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent, respectively.
Proof. The assertion can be shown in an analogous way to Theorem 3.4 of [15] .
The following result gives limit relations in the most general situation, without any restriction on the dependence in the exposure vector. 
Proof. (a) We use Proposition 3.2 to obtain
The second ratio converges by Proposition 3.2(a) and also the first, when taking there for h the identity function. The result follows then by vague convergence.
(b) Using 1-homogeneity of g and Proposition 3.2,
Recall that the sequence of bounded measures in (3.2) converges to a bounded measure vaguely if and only if it converges weakly to this measure, see Theorem 2.1.4 in [4] for further details. Hence, either assumptions on g in (b) is sufficient to achieve convergence for (3.6).
Corollary 3.5. Let u ∈ (0, ∞) and assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. Recall the constants
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 of [15] . For asymptotically independent claims V 1 , . . . , V d we obtain by Theorem 3.4(a) for the numerator
and the expression in the denominator is
which yields (3.7). In the case of asymptotically fully dependent claims we get by Theorem 3.4(b),
giving with corresponding nominator relation (3.8).
Remark 3.6. In extreme value theory the tail dependence coefficient is usually defined for two possibly dependent random variables X 1 , X 2 with the same marginal distribution function as lim x→∞ P(X 2 > x | X 1 > x) provided that this limit exists (e.g. Section 9.5 in [6] ). The resulting number is interpreted as a measure describing coinciding large losses. The conditional probabilities in Definition 1.1 (a)-(c) are defined via such conditional probabilities, allowing for asymmetry. As a consequence of regular variation the limits of the following conditional probabilities as well as the conditional expectations can be computed explicitly: if γ g /γ h → 1, then
and if γ = γ g = γ h , then we recognize
as the usual (symmetric) tail dependence coefficient, e.g. defined in [6] , p. 343, eq. (9.75).
Corollary 3.7. Let u ∈ (0, ∞) and assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. Recall the constants from (3.4).
(c) For g = h we obtain the classical Conditional Tail Expectation (1.1).
Proof. (a) We evaluate the integral in (3.5) as
where the measure ν * , called the canonical exponent measure, is related to the exponent measure ν of the vector [15] . For independent components ν * is concentrated on the axes. We take into account that, whenever x ∈ {uAK 1/α e j : u > 0}, the equality
holds. Integration over the set {u > 1/h(AK 1/α e j )} yields
(b) To show (3.12), recall that in the presence of full dependence the canonical exponent measure ν * for fully dependent components is concentrated on the diagonal {u1 ∈ R d : u > 0} and connected to the exponent measure ν of V by ν = ν * • K −1 , see also Lemma 4.2 in [15] . Hence,
.
This leads to (3.12).
The conditional systemic risk measures
We are now ready to investigate the conditional systemic risk measures from Definition 1.1 of a financial or insurance market based on the bipartite graph represented by the random matrix
i,j=1 as in (2.2) with q agents and d objects. First, we assess to which extent the risk of agent i is affected by high market losses. Second, we evaluate the influence of the individual agent's risk to the market risk, reflecting the systemic importance of an individual agent. Third, we consider the influence of the risk of agent k on the risk of agent i. Throughout this section we assume that the claims V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent.
In this section we return to the multivariate risk measures from Definition 1.1 applied to aggregation functions; we take again g(F ) as the projection on some component and h(F ) = F as a norm; here we can even allow for · to be only a quasi-norm. In particular this norm, or quasi-norm, does not have to equal the reference norm in the definition of regular variation in (3.1).
The following result determines the probability of joint large losses for individual institutions and the financial system in different conditional situations.
Proposition 4.1. Let V 1 , . . . , V d be asymptotically independent and u > 0. Assume that the conditions of Proposition 3.2 are satisfied. Moreover assume that γ → 0 and κ ∈ (0, ∞). Then
Moreover, for the Conditional Tail Expectations, if α > 1 then
Proof. We show the following, slightly more general result: Let
then under the assumptions of this proposition,
To show this general result we set VaR 1−γκ (g(F )) = t and VaR 1−γ (h(F )) = ut. Now recall that by Lemma 2.3
This implies that
We conclude that (4.7) holds by Corollary 3.5.
The analogous expressions for the Conditional Tail Expectation follow immediately from Corollary 3.7.
Remark 4.2.
Here is an interpretation of (4.1) from the viewpoint of a regulator. Assume that the market situation changes from its normal situation such that, for instance, F > δVaR 1−γ ( F ) for some δ > 1, then by (3.7) the factor κ in the limit in (4.1) becomes δ α κ. For the sake of argument we call the first contribution of the sum on rhe right-hand side of (4.1),
Consider the situation, where the minimum has been attained by the individual contribution under previous market conditions. Then the change in the market, which resulted in the change of κ to δ α κ for some δ > 1 can result in two situations. In the first one, the minimum is still assumed by the individual contribution, even though it is increased by the factor δ α . If the systemic change is so substantial that the individual contribution becomes larger than the systemic constant, then the limit on the right-hand side of (4.1) becomes the systemic constant.
If a regulator implements the strategy that the limiting conditional probability remains the same under all market conditions, then it would firstly require that under normal market conditions
If the market comes under stress, then the regulator would raise the Value-at-Risk for the institution as long as the minimum is still taken by the individual contribution. The situation, however, that the minimum is taken by the systemic constant indicates that the stressed market condition can no longer be absorbed by an adjustment of the individual capital reserves. Then political measures have to be taken.
The other limit relations have analogous interpretations.
For each of the limiting expressions in Proposition 4.1 the limiting behaviour for κ → 0 is linear, as is made precise in the next proposition.
We assume that there exist constants w, W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤ W ij ≤ W and that there exist constants b, B such that 0 < b ≤ Ae j ≤ B. For example, if W ij = deg(j) −1 1(i ∼ j) then we can take w = 1 1+d and W = 1. We set
Moreover, we define
and note that τ (i) ≤ 1 and τ (i, k) ≤ 1 through the definitions of C S ind and C i ind , respectively. If i and k do not share an object then τ (i, k) = 0. Theorem 4.3. Assume that the conditions for Proposition 4.1 hold and that there exist finite constanst w, W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤ W ij ≤ W and also finite constants b, B such that
Proof. To show (4.10) we start with (4.1). Consider the expression
If i ∼ j then the minimum is 0, and if i ∼ j then we can choose
While this expression is random, κ 0 is not random, and for κ ≤ κ 0 , (4.13) is satisfied for any realisation of the network. Hence
Summing over j = 1, . . . , d and recalling the definition of C i ind gives (4.10). For (4.11) we start with (4.7); the argument is similarly straightforward. Consider the expression
In particular, this equation holds for κ ≤ κ 1 with κ 1 given in (4.8). Again summing over all j gives (4.11).
To show (4.12) we use (4.3) Consider the expression
for α > 0. Summing over j gives the assertion (4.12).
Following on from (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) we can now assess the limiting behaviour of ICoVaR, SCoVaR and MCoVaR from Definition 1.1, specified for the aggregation function h(F ) = F , where F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) is the random exposure vector. For γ i , γ ∈ (0, 1) referring to agent i and the market, respectively, we consider the following conditional systemic risk measures:
Theorem 4.4. Assume that there exist constants w, W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤ W ij ≤ W and that there is an upper bound a < ∞ such that Ae j ≤ a. Recall the constants from (4.8) and (4.9)
and if τ (i, k) = 0 then, as γ i → 0,
Proof. First, from (4.1) and (4.10), for κ ≤ κ 0 = κ 0 (i), as γ → 0,
Hence for γ i ≤ κ 0 , γ → 0,
The asymptotics for the VaR follow from Lemma 2.3, yielding (4.14). For (4.15), (4.7) and (4.11) give that for γ → 0 and κ > κ 1 = κ 1 (i),
In particular, a simple rescaling gives
Now (4.15) follows as before. For (4.16), (4.3) and (4.12) give that for γ → 0 and κ ≤ κ 2 (i, k),
Changing variables gives that
The last assertion follows from the fact that F i and F k are independent if they do not share an object.
Remark 4.5. The asymptotic behaviour of the risk measures is assessed in Theorem 4.4 through the exceedance probabilities conditioned on an extreme event. For example, in (4.16), agent k has already incurred a very large loss. This loss will have an effect on the loss of agent i if they share some objects in their portfolios. The more objects they share, the larger τ (i, k) would be. The unconditional VaR threshold 1 − γ i at which P (F i > t) = γ i has to be adjusted to 1 − γ
, hence the more stringent the requirements on agent i.
The effect of the network on the agent in (4.15) indicates the dependence on τ (i), which increases with the number of connections of agent i. Again, the larger τ (i), the more stringent the requirements on agent i should be.
Even in (4.14) there is dependence of the network structure, which is reflected in κ 0 (i) as well as in C i ind .
Approximation and illustration of network effects
Throughout this section we restrict ourselves to the situation that the losses V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent.
Losses which are not covered
In the bipartite graph model, depending on the random mechanism of the agents to choose various objects, it can happen that certain objects are not chosen by any of the agents. In the (re)insurance context of Example 2.1 this means that certain large losses may be not insured. This happens for instance for certain natural catastrophes like earthquakes, where the state or the international community may be liable, see [17, 19] for further information and concrete numbers. In this subsection we approximate the probability of large losses not covered and we define
as the (random) number of non-covered losses.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that the asymptotically independent objects V 1 , . . . , V d have Pareto tails given in (2.1). Then
Proof. We condition on all possible sets W of non-covered losses and calculate
as t → ∞, using that for the asymptotically independent regime (cf. Lemma 2.3 of [15] ,
Hence, interchanging the order of summation and using the law of total probability,
Example 5.2. Assume that, given the number of non-insured losses is N = w for 0 ≤ w ≤ d, all sets of these w claims have the same probability to be not covered. Then Proposition 5.1 takes on a particularly simple form. In this setting, P(deg(l) = 0 | N = w) = w/d for every l ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and
Moreover, if all edges are independent and have same probability p ∈ [0, 1] to be present, then
In this case, the probability of large non-insured losses can be approximated by
Independent bipartite graph model: conditional systemic risk measures
In this section we exemplify our results based on a bipartite network model, where all edges are independent and the weighted adjacency matrix A is as in Example 2.1, referring to the situation of a large claims insurance market. Hence,
Poisson approximations
If d and q are large, we can provide Poisson approximations for the quantities
Ae j , and EA Proposition 4.1 from [15] gives that
and, for the r-norm for some r ≥ 1,
We shall also employ
3)
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of (2.6), (5.1) and (5.2).
Lemma 5.3. With the notation as above
Similarly as in Lemma 5.3 we can derive Poisson approximations for the limiting quantities from Proposition 4.1, as follows.
Then for r ≥ 1, for the limiting expressions of the Conditional Value-at-Risk measures, 11) and for i = k,
Proof. We compute for the constants in the conditional probabilities
With (5.13),
and consequently
(5.14)
Now consider the function k(x) = min
Now we use a result from the Stein-Chen method to assess the distance to a Poisson distribution in total variation distance, Eq. (1.23), p. 8, from [3] . This result states that, if W is the sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities p i and
Applying (5.15) to the function t(x) and keeping (5.14) in mind yields (5.7). The bound (5.8) follows similarly. Finally,
As the positive function k(x) = (2 + x) −α is bounded by 1 and as =1,...,q; =i,k 1( ∼ j) is a sum of independent Bernoulli variables, (5.15) can be applied, and (5.9) follows.
For the Conditional Tail Expectations, with (5.13),
Hence (5.1) applies, and yields (5.10). Similarly, with (5.13),
Again (5.1) applies, and yields (5.11). For the last part we mimick the proof of Proposition 4.1 in [15] . By the independence of the edges, 
Homogeneous independent bipartite graph model: Illustrations
To depict our results we consider the most basic case of the bipartite graph that the edges are not only independent but also equally likely; denote the edge probability with p ∈ [0, 1]. We also call the edge probability the connectivity parameter, as it is directly proportional to the density of the network. In this network model all agents behave exchangeably. For this model the market ranges from a market with no activity at all (p = 0) to a complete graph (p = 1). Note that non-conditional risk measures on this type of network have already been studied in [15] . Here, we are interested in the asymptotic expressions given in Proposition 4.1 as well as in Theorem 4.4 concerning the degree of tail dependence, conditional tail expectations and conditional Value-at-Risk, seen as a function of the edge probability p, and as a function of κ where applicable. In all cases, for simplicity of exposition, we concentrate on the interaction of an agent given the systemic stress and vice versa. We use the following abbreviations for the right-hand asymptotic expressions of the conditional systemic risk measures in (4.5) and (4.4), respectively: (AS corresponds to an agent's risk to exceed its threshold given that the system exceeds its threshold, and SA to the system's risk to exceed its threshold given that a specific agent exceeds its threshold):
Plots which depend on p start at p = 0.01. In Figure 2 , both quantities are plotted as functions of the edge probability p exemplarily for different (quasi-)norms while fixing the tail index α = 5. The left-hand plot shows the curves of C AS ind . As the parameter p increases, the connectivity in the network increases, having two effects: Firstly, more object are insured, hence, the agents take a greater risk load. Secondly, risk sharing among agents who jointly insure an object increases. We can then clearly recognise that the norms with r > 1 favour diversification leading to a non-monotone behaviour of the curve as the result of the two compelling characteristics of a greater risk load and positive diversification effects, whereas in the quasi-norm case, diversification is punished and strengthens the effect of a greater risk load. The right-hand plot shows the curve of C SA ind . Since we consider market losses aggregated by some (quasi-)norm, the losses even for the complete market depend on the norm parameter r, which is one major difference to the left-hand plot. We also recognise the appearance of non-monotone curves even for quasi-norms and the sum norm. In the quasi-norm case there is a (relatively high) value of p at which the risk constant C SA has a local minimum. The tail dependence coefficient from (4.1) with κ = 1. Left: fixed sum-norm (r = 1) and different tail indices α; for small α, the tail dependence coefficient is almost linear, while for larger values of α, the curves are non-monotone. Right: tail index α = 5 fixed and different (quasi-)norms. The tail dependence coefficient is almost constant before increasing steeply. In both plots peaks only appear for the sum-norm and the quasi-norms. Figure 3 illustrates the symmetric tail dependence coefficient, which is (4.1) for κ = 1;i.e.,
as a function of the edge probability p. In the left-hand plot, which concentrates on the very natural sum-norm (r = 1) and different tail indices α, we observe that for small α, the tail dependence coefficient is almost linear in the network connectivity parameter p, but for larger values of α, the behaviour becomes non-monotone and there exists a locally optimal connectivity parameter p. As effects of the minimum function, we see small peaks on the curves. In the righthand plot, fixing α = 5, the tail dependence coefficient is almost constant before increasing steeply when the network is nearly a complete graph. Furthermore, peaks, which occur through the minimum function, only appear for the sum-norm and the quasi-norms here. Allowing for asymmetry of the tail dependence coefficient in Proposition 4.1 through the value κ potentially differing from 0, we illustrate the results versions associated with agent behaviour conditional on system distress and vice versa; i.e., the right-hand sides in (4.1) (agent given system) and (4.7) (system given agent), which read as
, γ → 0. Figure 4 shows both quantities as functions of the edge probability p, exemplarily for the tail index α = 5 and the sum norm. In the left-hand plot-agent given system-all curves apparently converge to the same point as p → 0 which in our case is close to 0.2. Hence, the influence of κ diminishes as the network gets less connected. As we move to the complete network; i.e. for p → 1, for all κ ≥ 1, the curves converge to one single curve, which is clear from the formulas, and in the case of κ < 1, the curves converge to κ, which can be recognized as the work of the minimum function. Contrary to the left-hand plot, in the right-hand plot-system given agentthe values for less connected networks; i.e., small values of p, lie far apart from each other. This observation can be explained as follows: for small p it would not be unusual to see some A ij = 0, and it would not be very surprising to see the empty network, with A = 0. The probability that the norm of F is positive is larger than the corresponding probability of a single explosure F i , hence, κ is multiplied by the factor which has the greater probability to be non-zero. In both pictures, the curves for κ = 1 are dilated to the left and to the right for κ > 1 and κ < 1, respectively, compared to the symmetric case κ = 1; the directions of dilation are different in the left and the right plot. Figure 5 studies the same quantities but now as a function of κ, with some exemplary values for p. The resulting curves are piecewise linear as a result from taking the expectation. For deterministic matrices one would see only one line with particular slope before turning horizontal. For the risk of agent conditioned on system the curves are finally constant at level p, while for risk of system given agent the curves are horizontal at level 1 for κ sufficiently large. Figure 6 depicts the behaviour of theses curves for κ near to zero, which is connected to the asymptotics of the conditional Value-at-Risk in Proposition 4.4 through Theorem 4.3. The left-hand plot in Figure 6 shows that for κ sufficiently small all curves turn to a slope of 1. This fact is reflected in the asymptotics of ICoVaR 1−γ,γ i (F i | F ) by the absence of an additional factor. In contrast in the right-hand plot we observe different slopes, close to p in each case. These different slopes enter the formula for the SCoVaR 1−γ i ,γ as the τ (i) from (4.9); in the homogeneous model τ (i) = p.
